We examine corporate lobbying activity and mergers & acquisitions. If effective, firm lob-bying expenditures could influence legislation and facilitate favorable regulatory treatment, which would be positively reflected in market reactions to merger announcements. However, average announcement returns for lobbying rms are lower than for non-lobbying firms. In addition, lobbying firms tend to have powerful CEOs that receive more cash compensation after a merger. CEO turnover is unaffected by lobbying activity. These results suggest that corporate lobbying may be indicative of CEO entrenchment rather than a rm's attempt to maximize shareholder wealth.
JEL classification: G3, G34
Keywords: Lobbying, Mergers and Acquisitions, CEO turnover, CEO compensation, Corporate Governance
학회소식
공지사항
[2015년 제 2차] Lobbying Activities and Mergers and Acquisitions
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 1139
게시일 :
2015-06-03